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Sentence Structure: Prohibiting “Second 
or Successive” Habeas Petitions After 
Patterson v. Secretary 
CHRISTINA M. FROHOCK* 
   The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Patterson v. Sec-
retary includes a heated dispute over the prohibition against 
“second or successive” habeas corpus petitions in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b). Considering an amended criminal sentence from 
Florida state court, the majority and dissenting opinions 
structure that sentence differently and, thus, apply the pro-
hibition differently. This Article argues that both the major-
ity and the dissent conceal policy judgments beneath the sur-
face of legal decision-making. First, the Article analyzes the 
statutory prohibition against “second or successive” habeas 
petitions, as applied previously by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Magwood v. Patterson and by the Eleventh Circuit in In-
signares v. Secretary. Next, the Article describes the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Patterson v. Secretary, focus-
ing on section 2244(b) as the focal point of the judges’ dis-
pute. Finally, the Article argues that the statutory language 
of section 2244(b) underdetermines interpretations, inviting 
rival normative views regarding whether to prohibit a par-
ticular habeas petition.  Given such open statutory language, 
policy judgments are unavoidable. 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Legal Writing and Lecturer in Law, University of Miami 
School of Law; J.D. magna cum laude, New York University School of Law; 
M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., University of North Carolina. My thanks to 
Marcos D. Jiménez, K. Renée Schimkat, and Annette Torres for their helpful com-
ments. 
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“Sleight of hand” is a phrase often associated with Three-Card 
Monte and other magic tricks relying on concealment and misdirec-
tion. It is less often associated with federal court cases. When the 
phrase does appear in judicial opinions, it provides an illuminating 
analogy for the conduct of criminals or crafty attorneys.1 So the ap-
pearance of the phrase in the dissenting opinion in Patterson v. Sec-
retary, a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, is noteworthy both for its rarity and its target: the 
majority opinion.2 On one level, the dispute between the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Patterson concerns how to interpret the 
prohibition against “second or successive” habeas corpus petitions 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).3 Faced with an amended criminal sentence, 
the judges viewed the structure of that sentence differently and, thus, 
applied the prohibition differently.4 On a deeper level, the dispute 
reveals competing policy judgments in the habeas context.5 
This Article argues that both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Patterson engage in a sleight of hand, concealing policy 
judgments beneath the surface of legal decision-making. Part I de-
scribes the prohibition against “second or successive” habeas peti-
                                                                                                             
 1 See, e.g., Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 979 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 2 Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 812 F.3d 885, 896 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 3 Id. at 887, 896. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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tions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), as applied in two prior cases, Mag-
wood v. Patterson and Insignares v. Secretary.6 Part II then de-
scribes the majority and dissenting opinions in Patterson v. Secre-
tary, focusing on section 2244(b) as the focal point of the judges’ 
disagreement. Finally, Part III argues that the statutory language of 
section 2244(b) underdetermines varying interpretations, inviting ri-
val normative views regarding whether to prohibit a particular ha-
beas petition. While concealment and misdirection may be optional, 
policy judgments are unavoidable given the open statutory language 
in section 2244(b). 
I.   PRIOR INTERPRETATIONS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B) 
As amended in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), section 2244(b) prohibits claims presented 
in multiple petitions or applications for a writ of habeas corpus.7 
Congress intended the Act to streamline federal habeas proceedings 
and to ensure greater finality, restricting federal courts’ power to 
grant habeas relief to state prisoners.8 Section 2244(b)(1) provides 
that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus 
                                                                                                             
 6 Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010); Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. 
Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 7 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b). This Article follows the Supreme Court’s lead in using “petition” and 
“application” interchangeably. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 324 n.1 (“Although 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b) refers to a habeas ‘application,’ we use the word ‘petition’ in-
terchangeably with the word ‘application,’ as we have in our prior cases.”). 
 8 See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (“The enactment of 
AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the landscape for federal habeas corpus pe-
titions . . . [by] impos[ing] a 1-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal 
petitions . . . .”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (“Statutes such 
as AEDPA have placed more, rather than fewer, restrictions on the power of fed-
eral courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.”); Gilbert v. United 
States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The statutory bar against second 
or successive motions is one of the most important AEDPA safeguards for finality 
of judgment.”); Gonzalez v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1269 
(11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“The central purpose behind the AEDPA was to ensure 
greater finality of state and federal court judgments in criminal cases . . . .”); Ma-
haraj v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 304 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
AEDPA was designed to eliminate successive, piecemeal petitions for habeas cor-
pus relief.”). 
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application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior appli-
cation shall be dismissed.”9 Section 2244(b)(2) provides that “[a] 
claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application 
under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall 
be dismissed,” with narrow exceptions for (i) a new Supreme Court 
precedent applied retroactively or (ii) new factual discoveries that 
would have rendered a not-guilty verdict.10 To apply these prohibi-
tions, a court must determine whether a habeas petition is second or 
successive.11 If it is, and no exception applies, then the petition is 
properly dismissed.12 If it is not, then the petition is viable and 
properly heard on the merits.13 
“Second” and “successive” are common words, and the determi-
nation of a second or successive habeas petition appears simple at 
first glance: one petition is fine, but no others. Yet, the determination 
becomes complicated when a defendant files a habeas petition in 
federal court to collaterally attack his conviction or sentencing in 
state court, the state court then alters the criminal sentence, and the 
defendant then files a new habeas petition in federal court. To apply 
section 2244(b) in that scenario, the federal court must examine the 
state court judgments giving rise to the habeas challenges. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Patterson v. Secretary is the 
latest in a series of decisions interpreting section 2244(b), following 
the precedents of Magwood v. Patterson from the U.S. Supreme 
Court and Insignares v. Secretary from the Eleventh Circuit. With a 
focus on habeas petitions filed in the wake of resentencing, both 
Magwood and Insignares set the stage for Patterson. 
A. Supreme Court: Magwood v. Patterson 
In Magwood v. Patterson, the Supreme Court considered habeas 
corpus petitions filed by a convicted murderer in Alabama.14 Billy 
                                                                                                             
 9 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2013). 
 10 Id. § 2244(b)(2). 
 11 See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 337 (stating that § 2244(b) requires a “threshold 
inquiry into whether an application is ‘second or successive’”). 
 12 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2013). 
 13 See, e.g., Magwood, 561 U.S. at 331 (“If, however, Magwood’s application 
was not second or successive, it was not subject to § 2244(b) at all, and his fair-
warning claim was reviewable (absent procedural default).”). 
 14 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 330–42. 
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Joe Magwood fatally shot the sheriff who had overseen his prior in-
carceration for a drug offense.15 In 1981, a trial court sentenced 
Magwood to death.16 After the state courts denied direct and post-
conviction relief, Magwood filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in federal district court, challenging both his murder conviction 
and the constitutionality of his death sentence.17 The district court 
conditionally granted the writ, upholding the conviction but vacat-
ing the sentence.18 In 1986, the Alabama court conducted a new sen-
tencing hearing and again imposed the death penalty, stating that its 
“present judgment and sentence ha[ve] been the result of a complete 
and new assessment of all of the evidence, arguments of counsel, 
and law.”19 
More than a decade later, Magwood moved in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit for leave to file a second habeas peti-
tion challenging his original conviction.20 Section 2244(b)(3)(A) re-
quires that a petitioner obtain authorization from “the appropriate 
court of appeals” before filing a second or successive habeas petition 
in district court.21 Magwood correctly followed this authorization 
procedure to challenge his 1981 conviction, but the appellate court 
denied the motion.22 To challenge his 1986 sentence, however, Mag-
wood went straight to district court.23 He filed a habeas petition chal-
lenging the constitutionality of his new capital sentence, and again 
the district court conditionally granted the writ.24 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Magwood’s habeas 
petition directed to his second death sentence was an impermissible 
second or successive petition under section 2244(b).25 In that peti-
tion, Magwood argued that capital punishment was unconstitutional 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. at 324. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 324–26. 
 18 Id. at 326. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 327–28. 
 21 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2013). 
 22 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 328; see In re Magwood, 113 F.3d 1544, 1553 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
 23 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 328. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 329; see Magwood v. Culliver, 555 F.3d 968, 976 (11th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010). 
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because he did not have fair warning that his crime rendered him 
eligible for death.26 Finding that the trial court relied on the same 
aggravating factor to impose both death sentences, and that “the fair-
warning claim was available at Magwood’s original sentencing,” the 
Court of Appeals held that section 2244(b) prohibited Magwood’s 
petition as second or successive.27 The Supreme Court then granted 
certiorari and reversed.28 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas directed the Supreme 
Court’s analysis to the meaning of “second or successive” in section 
2244(b).29 A “claim” under section 2244(b) refers to “an asserted 
federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction,” 
while an “application” is “a filing that contains one or more 
‘claims.’”30 The “second or successive” phrase modifies applica-
tions for a writ of habeas corpus, not claims raised in those applica-
tions.31 If Magwood’s claim arose in a second or successive habeas 
application, then the district court should have dismissed the appli-
cation as procedurally defective.32 Section 2244(b)(3)(A) requires 
prior authorization from the court of appeals, which Magwood did 
not obtain.33 On the other hand, if Magwood’s claim did not arise in 
a second or successive application, then it fell outside the scope of 
section 2244(b) and inside the district court’s jurisdiction.34 The 
Court adopted the latter view.35 
                                                                                                             
 26 Magwood v. Patterson 561 U.S. 320, 328 (2010). 
 27 Magwood v. Culliver, 555 F.3d 968, 975–76 (11th Cir. 2009); see Mag-
wood v. Patterson 561 U.S. 320, 348–49 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The 
argument was that he was not eligible for the death penalty because he did not 
have fair notice that his crime rendered him death eligible. There is no reason that 
Magwood could not have raised the identical argument in his first habeas peti-
tion.”). 
 28 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 330, 343. 
 29 Id. at 330–34. 
 30 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005). 
 31 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 334–35 & n.10. 
 32 Id. at 331. 
 33 Id. at 330–31. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 331. 
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Section 2244(b) does not define “second or successive.”36 Ra-
ther, the phrase is a “term of art” that absorbs meaning from statu-
tory context and case law.37 In Magwood, the Supreme Court found 
the existence of a new judgment to be dispositive.38 The Court in-
terpreted the prohibition against second or successive habeas peti-
tions to apply only to petitions “challenging the same state-court 
judgment.”39 By its terms, section 2244(b) covers applications filed 
under section 2254, and section 2254 describes “[a]n application for 
a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 
the judgment of a State court.”40 Habeas is, after all, a cry for re-
lease: the petition “seeks invalidation (in whole or in part) of the 
judgment authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.”41 
Criminal judgments comprise both sentence and conviction.42 A 
change to any part of the judgment yields a new judgment and, 
hence, a new opportunity for habeas.43 Because Magwood’s 1986 
                                                                                                             
 36 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2013). 
 37 Id. at 332 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000)); see also 
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943–44 (2007) (“The phrase ‘second or suc-
cessive’ is not self-defining. It takes its full meaning from our case law, including 
decisions predating the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996.”). 
 38 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 338, 342. 
 39 Id. at 331 (emphasis in original). 
 40 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2013). 
 41 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 83 (2005); see Magwood, 561 U.S. at 
332. 
 42 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1) (“In the judgment of conviction, the court 
must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, 
and the sentence.”); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (noting that pe-
titioner’s “limitations period did not begin until both his conviction and sentence 
became final”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (“A judgment of 
conviction includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence.”); Insignares 
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (court previ-
ously “overruled [its] incorrect understanding of separate judgments of conviction 
and sentence”); Ferreira v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (noting that “the judgment to which AEDPA refers is the underlying 
conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s current deten-
tion”). 
 43 In the 1986 resentencing, the judge changed the previous judgment and 
found that Magwood’s mental state qualified as a statutory mitigating circum-
stance. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 325–36. The court in Magwood agreed that the 
1986 resentencing led to a new judgment. Id. at 331. 
2016] SENTENCE STRUCTURE: PROHIBITING "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE" 
HABEAS PETITIONS AFTER PATTERSON V. SECRETARY 1105 
 
resentencing resulted in a new judgment, the habeas petition chal-
lenging his sentence within that new judgment could not be second 
or successive.44 The petition must be first and, thus, outside the 
scope of section 2244(b). The conviction may be the same: unchal-
lenged and untouched.45 The sentencing outcome may be the same: 
capital punishment. The sentencing error may even be the same: fair 
warning.46 But the Court was unmoved: “[a]n error made a second 
time is still a new error.”47 
The majority in Magwood found no occasion to address the 
state’s concern that its opinion would encourage petitioners who re-
ceive a new judgment to file habeas petitions challenging both a new 
sentence and an undisturbed conviction.48 The case before the Court 
did not present those facts “because Magwood has not attempted to 
challenge his underlying conviction.”49 Although seven Justices ex-
pressed a worry about future abuses of the writ, Justice Thomas 
shrugged off such worries as “greatly exaggerated.”50 Considering 
only the habeas petitions filed by Billy Joe Magwood and the Ala-
bama court’s intervening new judgment, the Court concluded that 
section 2244 did not bar review of his fair-warning claim.51 
B.   Eleventh Circuit: Insignares v. Secretary 
In Insignares v. Secretary, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit considered habeas corpus petitions filed pro se by a prisoner 
                                                                                                             
 44 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 331, 339. 
 45 Id. at 326. 
 46 Id. at 328. 
 47 Id. at 339. 
 48 Id. at 342. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 340; cf. id. at 343 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment, joined by Stevens and Sotomayor, JJ.) (agreeing with the dissent 
that “if Magwood were challenging an undisturbed state-court judgment for the 
second time, abuse-of-the-writ principles would apply”); id. at 343–44 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ.) (“The Court today de-
cides that a state prisoner who succeeds in his first federal habeas petition on a 
discrete sentencing claim may later file a second petition raising numerous previ-
ously unraised claims, even if that petition is an abuse of the writ of habeas cor-
pus.”). 
 51 Id. at 342. 
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in Florida.52 In July 2000, Mitchel Insignares followed a man home 
from a Miami strip club and shot at him ten or eleven times.53 The 
victim escaped and later testified against Insignares at trial.54 A Flor-
ida jury convicted Insignares of attempted first-degree murder with 
a firearm, criminal mischief, and discharging a firearm in public.55 
He sought direct and post-conviction relief in state courts, including 
motions to correct an illegal sentence and to challenge his convic-
tion.56 The state judge reduced Insignares’ custodial sentence to 
twenty-seven years, including a twenty-year mandatory minimum 
sentence for attempted murder.57 The state appellate court then re-
versed his conviction for criminal mischief.58 
In 2007, Insignares filed a habeas petition in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida.59 The federal judge dis-
missed the petition as untimely.60 In 2009, Insignares filed a second 
motion in state court to correct his sentence.61 The judge granted the 
motion and reduced Insignares’ mandatory-minimum sentence for 
attempted murder from twenty years to ten years, but left intact his 
conviction and twenty-seven-year custodial sentence.62 A few 
months later, Insignares filed a second motion in state court to chal-
lenge his conviction.63 The judge denied the motion.64 
In 2011, without seeking prior authorization from the federal ap-
pellate court, Insignares filed another habeas petition in federal dis-
trict court.65 Both his 2007 habeas petition and his 2011 habeas pe-
tition alleged the same errors; Insignares attacked his underlying 
                                                                                                             
 52 Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1275–77 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 53 Id. at 1275–76 (describing scene in which “Insignares shot at him four 
times,” the victim “took refuge behind a car, and Insignares fired another six or 
seven shots”). 
 54 Id. at 1276. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1276–77. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1276. 
 59 Id. at 1277. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1277, 1281. 
 63 Id. at 1277. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 1277–78. 
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conviction and made claims of ineffective counsel and cumulative 
error.66 The district court heard the new petition and denied it on the 
merits.67 
Like the Supreme Court in Magwood, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Insignares concluded that a state court’s resentencing resulted in a 
new judgment.68 The Court of Appeals recognized “only one judg-
ment,” containing both sentence and conviction.69 Insignares’ 2011 
habeas petition may have triggered déjà vu in federal court cham-
bers, but nonetheless was the first to attack the Florida court’s 2009 
judgment.70 Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit answered the question of whether a habeas petition challenging 
an undisturbed conviction is second or successive when the inter-
vening judgment alters only the sentence: “we conclude that when a 
habeas petition is the first to challenge a new judgment, it is not 
‘second or successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge 
the sentence or the underlying conviction.”71 Therefore, the district 
court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of Insignares’ habeas pe-
tition.72 
In concurrence, Judge Fay expressed “some doubt and concern” 
about the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Magwood.73 Because 
a change to any part of a judgment yields a new judgment, an inter-
vening state court judgment wipes the habeas slate clean. A peti-
tioner can then challenge whatever he wishes—even parts of a judg-
ment that remained constant and that he challenged previously. The 
Florida court’s resentencing opened the door for Insignares to file 
multiple habeas petitions raising exactly the same claims.74 Facing 
                                                                                                             
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 1277. 
 68 Id. at 1281. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 1275; 1278–79. 
 71 Id. at 1281. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 1285 (Fay, J., concurring). 
 74 Id.; cf. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 812 F.3d 885, 895 (11th Cir. 
2016) (Haikala, J., concurring) (“[W]e must follow binding precedent even when 
application of that precedent may open the door—however briefly—to a second 
habeas petition.”). 
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the same conviction and twenty-seven-year prison sentence, In-
signares exploited the court’s resentencing to engage in “clear abuse 
of the writ.”75 Only four years after Magwood, worries about abuses 
of the writ shifted from exaggerated to concrete.76 
II.   SLEIGHT OF HAND IN PATTERSON V. SECRETARY 
Following Magwood and Insignares, Patterson presented a fa-
miliar procedural pattern. Ace Patterson engaged in conduct that 
even a judge ruling in his favor called “heinous” and “reprehensi-
ble.”77 In 1997, Patterson broke into his cousin’s home, kidnapped 
his cousin’s eight-year-old daughter from her bedroom, and repeat-
edly and brutally raped her.78 In 1998, a Florida jury convicted Pat-
terson of burglary, aggravated kidnapping of a child, and two counts 
of capital sexual battery.79 The court sentenced him to 311 months 
in prison, consecutive life terms in prison, and chemical castration.80 
Patterson appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed both his 
conviction and sentences.81 
In 2007, Patterson filed a federal habeas petition, which the dis-
trict court dismissed as untimely.82 Patterson then moved in state 
court to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court failed 
to satisfy the statutory requirements for chemical castration.83 Nei-
ther the state nor the victim’s guardian ad litem opposed Patterson’s 
request to correct the illegal sentence, deeming it moot in light of 
Patterson’s consecutive life sentences.84 In 2009, the trial court 
granted the motion, ordering that Patterson would “not have to un-
dergo [chemical castration] as previously ordered by the Court at his 
sentencing in the above styled matter.”85 The Florida court’s 2009 
                                                                                                             
 75 Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1285. 
 76 See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 340 (2010). 
 77 Patterson, 812 F.3d at 894 (Haikala, J., concurring). 
 78 Id. at 897 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. at 886 (majority opinion). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.; cf. id. at 897 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (providing 2006 as the date of Pat-
terson’s first federal habeas petition). 
 83 Id. at 886. 
 84 Id. at 897–98 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 898. 
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order amended his sentence in only one respect, by vacating the pun-
ishment of chemical castration.86 Patterson still faced life in prison, 
and his conviction remained intact.87 
In 2011, Patterson filed a new habeas petition in federal district 
court.88 The district court dismissed the petition as second or suc-
cessive.89 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit faced a familiar question: 
whether the new state court order amending Patterson’s sentence re-
sulted in a new judgment, thereby ensuring that Patterson’s new ha-
beas petition was not second or successive.90 
Writing for the majority, Judge Jordan analogized the facts be-
fore the court to the facts in Insignares and found no meaningful 
distinction.91 The Court of Appeals viewed the Florida court’s 2009 
order correcting a legal error and vacating the punishment of chem-
ical castration as a resentencing.92 Indeed, the court failed to see how 
the order “can be considered anything but a resentencing.”93 The 
state court “substantively altered the punitive terms of Mr. Patter-
son’s custody,” and that corrected sentence now authorizes the De-
partment of Corrections to hold Patterson.94 Accordingly, the state 
court’s 1998 judgment and 2009 order must be viewed together “in 
order to determine Mr. Patterson’s present and legally authorized 
sentence.”95 The alteration of punitive terms in the 1998 judgment 
“resulted in a new sentence, which yielded a new judgment.”96 Be-
cause Patterson’s 2011 habeas petition was the first to challenge that 
new judgment, it was not second or successive.97 
In dissent, Judge Pryor wrote a lengthy opinion landing some-
where between passionate and vitriolic. He described Patterson as 
the lucky winner of “the habeas lottery” and disparaged the majority 
                                                                                                             
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 887 (majority opinion). 
 91 Id. at 889–90. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 890. 
 94 Id. at 891. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 893. 
 97 Id. at 887. 
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opinion as “a sleight of hand” and “gimmickry.”98 In reaching the 
opposite conclusion, Judge Pryor focused on the judgment relevant 
for habeas analysis: “the new judgment must be a new ‘judgment 
authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.’”99 The Florida court’s 1998 
judgment committed Patterson to the custody of the Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, and he remains in custody pursuant to that 
judgment.100 In Judge Pryor’s view, the state court’s 2009 order va-
cating chemical castration did not authorize Patterson’s confinement 
and, thus, was irrelevant for habeas analysis.101 Accordingly, Patter-
son’s 2011 habeas petition should be deemed second or successive 
because his 2007 petition already attacked the 1998 judgment.102 
The crux of the dispute between Patterson’s majority and dis-
senting opinions lies in sentence structure: what counts as sufficient 
change to a criminal sentence to yield a new judgment and wipe the 
habeas slate clean? Judge Jordan conceded a gray area: “reasonable 
jurists can disagree about what constitutes a new judgment under 
Magwood.”103 The majority and dissent set different thresholds, 
with Judge Pryor adamantly fixing a high bar.104 The dissent criti-
cized the majority for “hold[ing] that any order that affects the judg-
ment authorizing a prisoner’s confinement somehow creates a new 
judgment authorizing his confinement.”105 For its part, the majority 
criticized the dissent for leaving specifics for a later day: “it is un-
clear whether formalism is the guiding principle, and we are left to 
guess whether it is a piece of paper, or a vacatur, or a substantive 
                                                                                                             
 98 Id. at 896, 904 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 99 Id. at 899 (quoting Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010)). 
 100 Id. at 897. 
 101 Id. at 899. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 894 (majority opinion). 
 104 See id. at 904 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for 
“[r]elaxing the bar on second or successive petitions”). 
 105 Id. at 900 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 902 (“A prisoner will be 
able to file another petition for a writ of habeas corpus any time a state court issues 
an order affecting his sentence—for example, an order removing a restitution ob-
ligation or a fine, an order reducing a sentence for substantial assistance to the 
government or based on a reduced sentencing guideline, or an order shortening a 
term of probation.”). 
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change (or something else altogether) that matters.”106 What matters 
for interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) is that the statute alone 
cannot resolve the dispute. The statutory language of section 
2244(b) is open, and judges are forced to import their own policy 
judgments to evaluate habeas petitions—a sleight-of-hand maneu-
ver evident in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Patter-
son. 
III.   UNDERDETERMINATION OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
Underdetermination is a doctrine in philosophy that describes 
“the relations between theory and evidence.”107 According to this 
doctrine, evidence underdetermines theory. Multiple, mutually in-
consistent theories may all have an equal relation to a set of evi-
dence.108 That is, the evidence supports Theory 1 just as well as it 
supports Theory 2. While not all theories need be on a par, at least 
some fare equally well.109 Thus, the evidence alone does not guide 
a choice among rival theories. Preference criteria must come from 
elsewhere. 
The doctrine of underdetermination shifts neatly from philoso-
phy to law, as statutes underdetermine interpretations.110 Multiple, 
                                                                                                             
 106 Id. at 894; accord In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585, 589–90 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(finding that because the district court did not enter an amended judgment of con-
viction nor impose a new sentence, “[t]he less fundamental change made to Lamp-
ton’s judgment of conviction is not enough to allow him to bypass AEDPA’s re-
strictions on piecemeal habeas litigation”); White v. United States, 745 F.3d 834, 
836 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting “substantial differences between resentencing and sen-
tence reduction” for purposes of section 2244). 
 107 See Larry Laudan, Underdetermination, in 9 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY 527, 527 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. at 528–29 (describing different arguments of underdetermination). 
 110 See, e.g., Patrick S. Shin, Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 26 (2012) (arguing in Title VII context that “[i]n the face of such under-
determination, the impermissibility of a disputed conduct will depend, as a matter 
of law, on which description of the conduct is given operative effect”); Kevin H. 
Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 85, 139 (2010) (arguing that attorney professionalism “standard 
acknowledges that there may be more than one legitimate interpretation of the 
legal authorities that bear on the client’s proposed conduct”); Lee J. Strang, The 
Role of Common Good in Legal and Constitutional Interpretation, 3 U. ST. 
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conflicting interpretations may all have an equal relation to statutory 
language; the words support Interpretation 1 just as well as they sup-
port Interpretation 2. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) does not 
guide a choice among rival interpretations of its prohibition against 
second or successive habeas petitions. To choose a best interpreta-
tion, a judge must import his or her own preference criteria in the 
form of policy judgments. 
Policy judgments—or subjective views reflecting a judge’s so-
cial, political, or economic beliefs—have long enjoyed a seat on the 
bench.111 Historically, courts stepped in “to hold laws unconstitu-
tional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely.”112 Ju-
dicial analysis prescribed a better world. More recently, courts have 
shied away from overt displays of policy for fear of transforming the 
judiciary into a quasi-legislative branch.113 Such reluctance may be 
                                                                                                             
THOMAS L. J. 48, 49, 62–74 (2005) (arguing that in both statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation, “the common good must play a role because of the underde-
termined nature of legal adjudication”). 
 111 Cf. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Contro-
versy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 13 
(2005) (“Policy judgments are judgments about social goals, the relative im-
portance of those goals, and the importance of avoiding specific types of er-
rors. . . . By their very nature, policy judgments cannot be made on any objective 
basis.”); United States v. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 811, 813 n.10 (1984) (analyzing discretionary function ex-
ception to Federal Tort Claims Act and recognizing that “[w]here there is room 
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion”) (quoting Dalehite v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953)). 
 112 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (describing due process 
analysis in the wake of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)); see Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“By empower-
ing judges to elevate their own policy judgments to the status of constitutionally 
protected ‘liberty,’ the Lochner line of cases left ‘no alternative to regarding the 
court as a . . . legislative chamber.’”) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 42 (Harvard Univ. Press 1958)). 
 113 See, e.g., Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730 (“We have returned to the original 
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic 
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”); 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 865 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[F]or judges to overrule that democratically adopted policy judgment on the 
ground that it shocks their consciences is not judicial review but judicial govern-
ance.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) 
(“However persuasive these considerations might be in a legislative forum, we as 
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futile, as “activist judge” has become a frequent epithet hurled at the 
authors of controversial opinions.114 
In the context of statutory interpretation, policy judgments are 
an essential normative tool. Even the loudest champion of judicial 
restraint, the late Justice Scalia, conceded that “no statute can be en-
tirely precise.”115 Some judgments, including “judgments involving 
policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law 
and to the judges applying it.”116 The doctrine of unconstitutional 
delegation prohibits Congress from ceding all authority, as “basic 
policy decisions governing society are to be made by the Legisla-
ture.”117 But it may cede a great deal. The Supreme Court has re-
sisted capping the degree of policy judgment that Congress may del-
egate to other branches of government.118 Rather, the degree reflects 
the language of the statute at issue. 
                                                                                                             
judges cannot override the specific policy judgments made by Congress in enact-
ing the statutory provisions with which we are here concerned.”). 
 114 See, e.g., S.M., Those “Activist” Judges, THE ECONOMIST (July 8, 2015, 
9:25 P.M.), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/07/judi-
cial-politics-0 (“Critiques of judicial activism are, in the end, rarely critiques of 
judicial activism. They are cries of despair masked as principled stances against 
unelected judges deciding major questions for hundreds of millions of Ameri-
cans.”). 
 115 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415, 420 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (rejecting Sentencing Commission standards on grounds of unconstitu-
tional delegation “because they are not standards related to the exercise of execu-
tive or judicial powers; they are, plainly and simply, standards for further legisla-
tion”); accord ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 24 (2012) 
(“Despite an occasional judicial opinion recalling bygone glories, our system of 
separated powers never gave courts a part in either the drafting or the revision of 
legislation.”); Adam Cohen, Psst . . . Justice Scalia . . . You Know, You’re an Ac-
tivist Judge, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.ny-
times.com/2005/04/19/opinion/psst-justice-scalia-you-know-youre-an-activist-
judge-too.html?_r=0 (“Last month, after the Supreme Court struck down the death 
penalty for those under 18, [Justice Scalia] lashed out at his colleagues for using 
the idea of a ‘living Constitution’ that evolves over time to hand down political 
decisions -- something he says he would never do.”). 
 116 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 416–17 (noting that “a certain degree of discretion, and thus of law-
making, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by 
the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up 
to a point—how small or how large that degree shall be”); see id. at 378 (stating 
1114 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
The language of section 2244(b) is wide open. Section 2244(b) 
requires, with narrow exceptions, that a court dismiss any habeas 
petition that is “second or successive.” The term-of-art phrase does 
not self-define nor reflect common usage.119 Standing alone, the 
words “second or successive” do not favor one interpretation over 
another. Courts must look elsewhere to determine meaning, includ-
ing to statutory context and case law. Relying on context and case 
law, the courts in Magwood, Insignares, and Patterson all focused 
their analyses on state court judgments, specifically changes to the 
criminal sentence contained within a judgment.120 But context and 
case law go only so far. To evaluate changes to the criminal sen-
tence, courts look elsewhere still. 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Patterson rest on 
policy judgments, though hidden beneath the veneer of “objective 
legal standards.”121 Each opinion reflects a different social belief re-
garding the proper beneficiary of our criminal justice system: the 
majority favors the prisoner’s perspective, while the dissent favors 
the victim’s perspective. Accordingly, the majority opinion pro-
motes a robust and liberal habeas regime, in which prisoners are af-
forded considerable leeway to challenge their confinement and the 
government is tasked with carefully avoiding mistakes in sentenc-
ing. The victim stays in the shadows, without one mention in the 
majority opinion. Perhaps attempting to make this social belief more 
palatable, Judge Jordan uses the word “substantive” seven times to 
describe the state court’s amendment to Patterson’s sentence.122 The 
                                                                                                             
that congressional delegations can “carry with them the need to exercise judgment 
on matters of policy”) (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1943) 
(approving congressional delegation to Price Administrator “to promulgate regu-
lations fixing prices of commodities which ‘in his judgment will be generally fair 
and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act’”), and Nat’l Broad. Co. 
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216–17 (1943) (approving congressional delega-
tion to Federal Communications Commission to act in “public interest”)). 
 119 See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010); Panetti v. Quarter-
man, 551 U.S. 930, 943–44 (2007). 
 120 See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332–33; Insignares v. Secretary, 755 F.3d 1273, 
1281 (11th Cir. 2014); Patterson v. Secretary, 812 F.3d 885, 891 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 121 Patterson, 812 F.3d at 895 (Haikala, J., concurring). 
 122 See id. at 887 (agreeing with Patterson that “the state trial court substan-
tively amended his sentence”), 889 (noting that state court granted Patterson’s 
“motion to correct, substantively vacating a portion of the sentence”), 891 (stating 
that “the appropriate approach is to focus on the legal error corrected by, and the 
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description makes sense from Patterson’s perspective. For him, the 
state court’s vacatur of a pending chemical castration no doubt pro-
vided enormous relief. 
By contrast, the dissenting opinion promotes a rigid and con-
servative habeas regime, in which prisoners are generally afforded 
a single opportunity to challenge their confinement and victims are 
granted respite and security. Perhaps attempting his own sweetener, 
Judge Pryor devotes considerable attention to the details of Patter-
son’s violence and to the young victim of his crimes.123 Curtailing 
habeas opportunities makes sense from the perspective of the victim, 
as well as the government. She has suffered enough, and state re-
sources are precious and strained.124 For both the victim and the gov-
ernment, the state court’s vacatur of chemical castration was not suf-
ficiently substantive to warrant opposing Patterson’s motion to cor-
rect his sentence. 
Neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion is an out-
lier. Both policy judgments claim adherents.125 Both policy judg-
ments are also consistent with the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), 
                                                                                                             
substantive effect of” state court’s order; recognizing that “[w]here a state court 
corrects a legal error in an initial sentence, and imposes a new sentence that is 
substantively different than the one originally imposed, there is a new judgment”; 
and noting that state court’s removal of chemical castration “punishment substan-
tively altered the punitive terms of Mr. Patterson’s custody”), 893 (finding that 
state court’s “order substantively changed Mr. Patterson’s sentence”) (stating that 
“substantive alteration of the punitive terms of Mr. Patterson’s original judgment 
resulted in a new sentence”) (all emphases added). 
 123 See id. at 897–98 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (describing “the trauma he caused 
the victim,” an eight-year-old girl sleeping in her bed) (noting that “[o]rdinarily, 
that decision would have brought closure to the victim of his crimes, who was by 
then eighteen years old,” and that the victim’s guardian ad litem “believed that 
contesting his motion was not worth ‘expos[ing] the victim to the painful remem-
brance of the Defendant’s actions against her’”) (citing case law that finality “ben-
efits the victim”), 902 (criticizing majority opinion for likely “forcing the victim 
to relive the crime and prosecution”), 904 (claiming majority opinion “will 
threaten a twenty-six-year-old woman to relive the horror of his monstrous 
crimes”). 
 124 See id. at 902–03. 
 125 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (“The States’ core police powers have always included authority to define 
criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”); Min-
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as the majority and dissent find equal textual support. The majority 
interprets “second or successive” to mean a later habeas petition 
filed without any change in sentencing that the prisoner would find 
substantive. A substantive change from the prisoner’s perspective 
yields a new judgment and renders section 2244(b) inapplicable. 
The dissent interprets “second or successive” to mean a later habeas 
petition filed without any change in sentencing that the victim would 
find substantive. A substantive change from the victim’s perspective 
yields a new judgment and renders section 2244(b) inapplicable. 
Reasonable jurists can indeed disagree.126 Because section 2244(b) 
underdetermines what constitutes a new judgment intervening be-
tween habeas petitions, a judge’s subjective views guide the choice. 
Thus, the doctrine of underdetermination shines a light on statu-
tory interpretation. The animating interpretive force is equal parts 
statutory language and policy judgment. Given that the words of the 
statute stay neutral among preference criteria, there is no need for 
concealment or misdirection. Bring the preference criteria to light, 
and the full opinion emerges. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the Patterson dissent’s “sleight of hand” remark 
proves less insult than insight. A judge’s worldview fills the inter-
pretive vacuum of open statutory language. Judges, like all of us, fill 
gaps as they see fit. Both the majority and dissenting opinions hide 
                                                                                                             
nesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (describing Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for defendants); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (“The boast of our criminal procedure is that it protects an 
accused, so far as legal procedure can, from a bias operating against such a group 
to which he belongs.”); Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and 
Punishments (1778), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/docu-
ments/Jefferson/01-02-0132-0004-0064 (“government would be defective in it[s] 
principal purpose were it not to restrain such criminal acts, by inflicting due pun-
ishments on those who perpetrate them”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Institute 
of Justice, The Rights of Crime Victims—Does Legal Protection Make a Differ-
ence? (Dec. 1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/173839.pdf (“The President’s 
Task Force on Victims of Crime concluded in its 1982 Final Report that there was 
a serious imbalance between the rights of criminal defendants and the rights of 
crime victims.”). 
 126 See Patterson, 812 F.3d at 894. 
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policy judgments within their legal judgments. The statutory prohi-
bition against second or successive habeas petitions is consistent 
with, and in fact invites, these rival policy judgments. The illusion 
is that judicial opinions are based solely on the law. 
